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Abstract 
Gasoline retail prices are generally easily observable on an everyday basis, and high price 
volatility raises public concern. There seems to be widespread opinion that higher gasoline 
prices are the result of firm collusion aimed at restricting local competition. The purpose of 
this paper is to test the nature of competition concerning price setting in the Norwegian retail 
gasoline market. By using data on daily retail gasoline prices collected during spring 2005 in 
two Bergen areas, Sandviken and Askøy, we attempt to define if the competition climate can 
be described as competitive, imperfectly competitive or tacitly collusive. An econometric 
method used is based on the distinction of the effects of local market competition, input 
prices and common strategies of oil companies on trends in daily retail prices. We can not 
reject the hypothesis that retail gasoline stations enter tacit agreements, and we find that the 
observed behavior is inconsistent with the competitive model or with the non-collusive 
imperfect competition model.      
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1. Introduction  
Retail gasoline markets have characteristics that make them different from other commodity 
markets. Most petrol companies control the production process from the exploration of crude 
oil to the refining and distribution of the final product. On the Norwegian retail gasoline 
market these integrated players have a very dense retail network and meet each other in most 
local markets. Theoretically, a situation with few integrated companies operating on the 
market, which in addition have large market power concentration, makes tacit or explicit 
cooperation in setting higher prices easier.  
There seems to be widespread public concern in many countries that high gasoline prices are 
the result of firms’ collusion, which naturally restricts competition. The reasons why 
gasoline prices get so much attention when prices are raising are that fuel expenses 
constitute a large part of households’ budget and that gasoline prices are easily observable in 
everyday life. It is plausible that volatility in retail gasoline prices due to other factors, such 
as for example, corresponding fluctuations in international crude oil prices, could be 
sometimes mistaken as evidence of collusion.  
In this paper we attempt to contribute to the solution of the problem by using data on price 
dispersion across two geographical Bergen areas over the same 5-month long time period. 
We estimate the impact of local market competition, input prices and common strategies of 
oil companies on trends in daily retail prices charged for Euro 95 gasoline. We distinguish 
the effects, which all mentioned factors individually have on retail prices, separately for both 
areas, and further apply them to area characteristics by using relevant elaborated theory of 
tacit collusion. On the ground of this we make a conclusion about competition structure in 
the area.   
In Norway several investigations of gasoline industry have been carried out by the 
Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet), and no signs of collusion in the 
market were found so far. Although, several integrated players operating on the Norwegian 
gasoline market, were proven participating in tacit collusions on the gasoline retail markets 
in other countries, such as Sweden and Italy. Moreover, the structure of the Norwegian 
gasoline market theoretically makes existence of collusions possible. Therefore, we think 
that more thorough analysis of the situation is required. 
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Current paper, which is based on the analysis of comprehensive data, makes a contribution 
to the solution of the problem. The results might have practical relevance for policymakers, 
who currently base their decisions on assumption of competitive gasoline markets. 
Therefore, if tacit collusion is in fact takes place on the market, efforts aimed at ensuring 
lower retail gasoline prices through enhancing competition at both retail and wholesale 
levels should be made. 
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1.1 Hypothesis 
Price discrimination is one of the monopoly power enhancing practices. It is based on the 
principle of differentiated pricing of the same product sold to different consumers, for 
reasons not associated with differences in costs (Moschandreas, 2000). This practice allows 
companies to reach higher total revenues. Due to peculiar characteristics of gasoline, 
geographical markets of which can be effectively segregated in most cases, the so called 
“third degree of price discrimination” can be applied.  
In addition, Norwegian market for gasoline can be characterized as an oligopolistic, since 
gasoline is sold exclusively through very few vertically integrated chains, which belong to 
five major brands (figure 3.1). These firms have a very dense retail network and meet each 
other in many local markets. Moreover, the five major brands are not present in all local 
geographical markets, making oligopoly even more valid. Decision making for different 
gasoline stations in different local markets depends to a certain degree on conjectures about 
behavior of rivals, located in the same area. In order to avoid uncertainty and rivalry, which 
may result in price wars, and to increase market power, chains and consequently stations can 
enter into collusive agreements.  
According to Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurranseloven §10), any form of 
formal or informal competition restricting agreements, including those concerning retail 
price, are prohibited if it can be proved that parties have been in contact with each other. It is 
not illegal to unilaterally adjust retail prices to other firms’ prices.     
On the ground of all said above, we state that  
Norwegian retail gasoline chains enter into tacit collusive agreements.                
We base our hypothesis on the evidence on retail price variation collected during a 5-month 
period at five different gas stations belonging to three major gasoline brands and located in 
two separate geographical areas.   
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1.2 Materials and Methods 
The data on prices of unleaded gasoline Euro 95 was collected from the display boards of 
five different gas stations located in two Bergen areas – Sandviken and Askøy, and from 
official primary data publications available on the internet. In addition secondary sources of 
information, both quantitative and qualitative, such as results of macroeconomic analysis of 
the industry and published opinions of experts in the field, were used.  
In order to verify hypothesis one should apply data to the theory. In the first part of the paper 
we consider three relevant, in our opinion, theoretical models of competition. We first make 
an assessment in rather general terms and then apply them to retail gasoline industry, 
creating a base for relating our results to it later. We also give brief overview over which 
models authorities and experts think realistically describe state of affairs in different 
countries including Norway.  
In the second part we describe current situation on the Norwegian retail gasoline market, 
giving brief assessment of market structure, main players, trends in retail and wholesale 
prices as well as presenting collected data. 
Further in the paper we formulate an econometric model for primary data assessment, which 
is based on the multiple linear regression analysis of time-series data. By doing this we aim 
to predict how trends in prices at the considered gas stations are dependent on different 
factors, such as local competition, company’s common strategy or changes in input prices, 
all expressed in quantitative terms. In this part we also define several qualitative parameters, 
which could be significant in a process of theory application.    
 
1.1.1 Multiple regression model 
In general terms the model with k predictors is like following:  
,...110 uxxy kk ++++= βββ  
where y – dependent variable, x1-xk – predictor variable, 0β  - intercept, -  measure the 
change in y with respect to x
1β kβ
1- xk, holding other factors fixed, u – error term (disturbance). 
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Based on zero conditional mean assumption, regression coefficients , ,…, , which 
are the estimates of , ,…, , are obtained by applying so called “least-squares 
procedure”, which minimises the sum of squared residuals (Wooldridge, 2006): 
0
∧β 1
∧β k
∧β
0β 1β kβ
)(
1
2
1
2 ∑∑
=
∧
=
∧
−==
n
t
tt
n
t
t yyuSSR     
Once intercept and slope estimates are determined, it is possible to form the OSL regression 
line: 
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A useful parameter of the regression is coefficient of determination 2R , which measures the 
overall quality of the regression: 
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It is the percentage of total variation exhibited in the y data that is accounted for by the 
sample regression line. A high 2R  means that most of the variation we observe in the y data 
can be attributed to their corresponding x values. 
In order to check the model for validity, considering the nature of the data, we find it useful 
to perform autocorrelation and multicollinearity tests. Autocorrelation test checks the 
assumption of independence of the error terms, since for time-series data the error terms can 
be correlated across time. Also considering retail price formation process, the problem of 
multicollinearity (when two of the x variables are strongly correlated) can arise, which can 
provide coefficient estimates with a wrong sign or magnitude.  
 
In the next chapter we perform data analysis. It is primarily based on the statistical model 
discussed above, although some additional tests and simple estimations are made. For price 
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comparison purposes we use paired t-tests. Simple statistical analysis of price adjustments is 
also performed. We use statistical software STATA as a tool for performing all the 
calculations.   
In the final part we thoroughly discuss obtained results and apply them to the theory. 
Afterwards, conclusions about the nature of competition in the areas are made and 
hypothesis is substantiated.  
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2. Applicable competition models 
Significant public belief in the incidence of collusive behavior in many western countries 
(USA, Canada, UK, etc.) has led to frequent public demands for government intervention to 
lower high gasoline prices due to price-fixing or other anti-competitive acts undertaken by 
large gasoline firms (Sen, 2003). Competition authorities in a number of European and North 
American countries have recently started investigating the competitiveness of retail markets 
for oil products. 
In some countries like Italy and Sweden authorities were able to show that big integrated 
players, who own a dense network of service stations, entered various collusive agreements, 
for example, by converging their “recommended prices” (Meerbeeck, 2003) or by 
simultaneously lowering list prices and introducing unfavorable discount systems 
(KonkurranseNytt 5/2004). As a result these companies have been imposed heavy fines for 
restricting price competition in retail gasoline markets. Most of these integrated players, 
such as Esso, Shell, Conoco, Norsk Hydro, Statoil and Texaco, are also active on the 
Norwegian retail petrol market.  
The authorities of a few other countries (Netherlands, Belgia) so far could not prove the 
existence of secret agreements between the oil companies, but concluded that price 
competition is in fact limited and pricing in the retail gasoline market needs to be monitored 
closely (Meerbeeck, 2003).  
In Canada and USA, on the other hand, competition authorities agreed that regional price 
differences and swings in price over time are chiefly a result of corresponding trends in 
crude oil prices rather than collusion of local firms (Sen, 2003).  Therefore, they described 
retail gasoline markets as competitive. However, they neither fully specified a single 
elaborated competitive market model of retail gasoline pricing, nor tested hypothesis to 
confirm the predictions the model might make (Eckert, et al., 2005).    
In Norway no clear cut conclusions about structure of retail gasoline market has been made 
so far by Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet), but several investigations 
of gasoline industry have been carried out. One of the key research areas was investigation 
into high retail price volatility in all of the Norwegian counties (Konkurransetilsynet, 2001).  
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High price volatility and dispersion was attributed to intense competition and did not serve 
as evidence of collusion for Konkurransetilsynet as it is sometimes interpreted in the 
literature. They also stated that although there were very few companies operating in 
vertically structured Norwegian petrol market, none of them had more than 30% share of the 
market and, therefore, it was generally competitive with no signs of collusion found so far 
(Konkurransetilsynet, 1998).  
According to the Competition Authority, the local market power that the firms can possess 
in some areas is outbalanced by centralized competition, since all of the companies meet 
each other in most local markets. Taking into consideration that many gasoline stations in 
every big chain operate under franchise agreements, Konkurransetilsynet allows oil 
companies to set maximum retail prices the former can charge, by that restricting local 
market power of stations and facilitating local competition. Increased local competition in 
turn is supposed to weaken incentives to collude on national scale. Moreover, the presence 
of a number of automatic gasoline stations (UnoX, Smart and Jet) is seen as factor 
facilitating competition in the areas they are located. The growth in number of these stations 
as well as their turnover on the ground of lower retail prices point to the fact that consumers 
are mobile, price aware and price sensitive, which can be interpreted as a sign of an efficient 
market (Konkurransetilsynet, 2001). 
One of other controversial issues we found in reports of the Norwegian Competition 
Authority was the existent wholesale practice of distribution of gasoline in existent vertically 
integrated market. The oil companies do not own gasoline depots in every area; instead in 
order to minimize transportation costs, their branded stations buy gasoline from the closest 
depot, which can belong to a competitive chain. On this ground major companies (Esso, 
Statoil, HydroTexaco and Shell) have bilateral agreements, which secure them steady and 
cheap supplies. In our opinion it creates high entrance barriers for other firms and 
independent stations. Although, in response to Jet’s complaint to Konkurransetilsynet on 
discrimination by quoting higher wholesale prices to Jet than to other major market players 
and by that restricting competition, the Competition Authority did not find that the majors 
exercise market power and did not consider interruption to be necessary 
(Konkurransetilsynet, 1998). 
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In general we find several conclusions made by Konkurransetilsynet to be controversial and 
inconsistent with the theory. The reasons to consider current market structure to be favorable 
for tacit collusions existence can be summarized as follows:  
- Observed high price volatility can sometimes serve as evidence of collusion, 
assuming firms are able to make sophisticated calculations to achieve the highest 
sustainable collusive price; 
- Large retail networks of all players lead to the situation where firms meet each other 
on almost all local markets, and collusion is, therefore, more likely;  
- Vertical integration and wholesale practice (bilateral agreements) of very few large 
players supports an oligopolistic market structure and create high entry barriers, 
which naturally restricts competition; 
- The existence of published recommended prices and maximum price agreements 
between companies and their franchisees can facilitate coordination on a collusive 
price or a set of retail prices (Meerbeeck, 2003).    
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the price space-time variation prediction of the tacit 
collusion model. The econometric model used for this will also generate results that describe 
the actual pricing pattern observed in the local market. If the tacit collusion model can be 
rejected, we can then determine whether the pricing pattern is more consistent with the type 
of pattern that could result from alternative types of pricing behavior. Two alternative types 
of pricing in the retail gasoline market are considered on the basis of conclusions drawn by 
competition authorities of other countries: competitive pricing (Canadian case, Eckert, et al., 
2005; Sen, 2003) and imperfectly competitive, non-collusive pricing in a spatial market 
(Dutch and Belgian cases, Meerbeeck, 2003). 
2.1 The competitive market model 
As it has been mentioned earlier, Canadian authorities and a number of industry 
functionaries adopt a competitive market model (www.competition.ic.gc.ca). The adoption is 
based on the belief that local retail gasoline markets satisfy three of the four basic 
assumptions of the classical model (Eckert, et al., 2005; Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 1997): 
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1. Consumers are mobile and can easily get information about prices at different 
stations in a particular geographical market. Gasoline stations have information about 
prices at rival stations as everybody posts prices (Perfect information principle); 
2.  Gasoline stations act as they are undifferentiated firms competing in a spaceless 
world (Product homogeneity principle); 
3. Individual stations set their own prices (implying Price taking principle). 
 
Because these principles eliminate all spatial product differentiation and expensive consumer 
search, retail prices are predicted to be the same everywhere in the market, irrespective of 
location, proximity to competitors or the characteristics of the retailers (Eckert et al., 2005). 
In addition he states that the retail price of gasoline established in the market in this case is a 
competitively determined price.   
At first sight it seems that it is easy to reject the competitive model right away, since the 
prices in the market are not the same. However, there are a few arguments in favor of still 
contemplating the model.  
First, as Eckert (2005) states, rejection of the model on this basis would not be sufficient to 
persuade its proponents in some countries that alternative models better explain retail 
gasoline station pricing; therefore, we need to specify an econometric model, which would 
contain variables that the competitive model suggests should not affect the probability that a 
station charges the market price. Otherwise, in absence of a clear rejection, the authorities 
will continue to be guided by a belief that retail gasoline markets are competitive and think 
that anti-competitive conduct in these markets can not succeed.  
Secondly, Sen (2003) emphasizes the impact of highly volatile international crude oil prices, 
which, as her research shows, contribute more to the high retail price level and dispersion 
than local market structure. Therefore, since both factors play an important role, it is hard to 
see whether price volatility in the retail market is due to corresponding fluctuations in 
international crude oil prices or an evidence of collusion. In order to avoid confusion, 
empirical studies requiring significant data need to be exercised. 
 13
 14 
2.2 Tacit collusion 
Although vertically integrated firms may not necessarily be engaging in collusive activities, 
retail gasoline prices should be impacted by the degree of competition in retail and 
wholesale markets. An increase in market concentration makes collusion among firms 
easier (Sen, 2003).  
On the other hand, unstable cost and/or demand conditions of the gasoline industry make it 
difficult to maintain such a collusion, creating conditions for the emergence of price wars. 
Borenstein and Shepard (1996) emphasize two factors - changes in demand and marginal 
cost, as contributable to sustainability of collusion. They claim that when current demand is 
higher and/or current costs are lower than expected future parameters, collusion is more 
difficult to sustain because the gain from cheating increases in the current period while the 
loss of punishment increases in future period with lower demand and/or higher costs. 
Therefore, collusion is more difficult to sustain when demand is declining or cost is 
increasing. Though as they mention, there is a reason to believe that non-collusive prices 
would also respond to expected future cost changes, change in costs would change collusive 
prices more than non-collusive ones due to the prediction that they will respond negatively.      
The selection of a collusive price is complicated by product and spatial differentiation. A 
distinction can be made between vertical and horizontal product differentiation. Vertical 
product differentiation is linked to quality differences, when consumers have the same 
ranking of the product variants and will buy the same variant provided that prices are 
uniform. Horizontal product differentiation takes place when, even if prices are uniform, 
different consumers prefer different variants due to their different tastes (Meerbeeck, 2003). 
Therefore, differences in the intrinsic quality of gasoline, service level and product mix, 
offered by different retailers, all can be sources of price differences across stations.  
Many authors (Slade, 1986) state that location effect plays the most important role in 
explaining price differences across stations. Since consumers usually prefer nearby stations, 
retail gasoline market is characterized by localized competition.  
In her research Slade (1986) on the example of Vancouver gasoline retail market shows that 
in spite of the fact that gasoline sold by different firms is chemically indistinguishable, 
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consumer preferences vary systematically with service-station characteristics. On this 
ground, demand at retail level is not perfectly elastic and she rejects the hypothesis that 
pricing is competitive. 
On the ground of all of the above, it is logical that collusive pricing can involve different 
retailers setting different prices, which can also change over time. The lack of a unique 
collusive price though possesses coordination difficulties for firms that may be alleviated 
through price matching (Eckert, et al., 2005).   
In general, economic theories are unable to predict the prices at which firms will tacitly 
collude. Outside of price-wars periods firms enter tacit collusions as a result of a repeated 
game. This yields higher pay-offs to all players in each period than the Nash (non-
cooperative) equilibrium of the one-shot game (Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 1998). Basic game 
theory (the Folk theorem of repeated games) demonstrates that, over an infinite time 
horizon, a group of firms can sustain a wide range of payoffs in a collusive equilibrium 
(Fudenberg, Tirole, 1991). There is also a number of alternating move models to retail 
gasoline, such as, for example, staggered price setting models (Eckert, et al., 2005). 
According to them, a large number of tacitly collusive prices can be sustained, although only 
one at the time. 
Tacit collusion models make different predictions regarding retail pricing behavior in a 
market, than the competitive market model or the imperfect non-collusive competition 
model. 
- Deviations from the tacitly collusive price 
For stations not participating in collusion, the optimal price can be either above or below 
the tacitly collusive price (Eckert, et al., 2005). An isolated station can set a monopoly 
price for that area, which will be above the tacitly collusive price. Alternatively some 
non-colluding stations can set their prices below the latter in attempt to overcome 
disadvantages in location or product. 
- Major players vs. fringe firms 
As we have already mentioned, large integrated players have bigger incentives to set the 
tacitly collusive price because the cost of not doing so is larger for them than that for 
smaller firms. Smaller firms may undercut the tacitly collusive price to increase market 
 15
 16 
share, believing that the cost to the larger firms of abandoning the tacitly collusive price 
exceeds the potential gain from responding to the lower price of the smaller firms 
(Eckert, et al., 2005). Major players also have greater ability to coordinate behavior 
given the fact that they meet each other in most of the local markets.         
- Spatial and product differentiation 
According to this model, consumers don’t view gasoline sold at different stations to be a 
homogenous product and price is not everything they care about. However, the model 
predicts that product characteristics should not affect the probability that tacitly collusive 
firms match prices (Eckert, et al., 2005). Eckert also states that allowing station 
characteristics to affect pricing would make achieving and maintaining the tacitly 
collusive price more difficult. However, we think that it is reasonable to allow for the 
constant differences in collusive prices between different colluding firms to be 
incorporated into the model, therefore, allowing a range of collusive prices instead of 
one single collusive price for all firms. This prediction is also in line with the earlier 
mentioned Folk theorem (general feasibility theorem).  
A station’s choice, whether to set collusive price, depends on local concentration of 
stations of the same brand and on the distance to the nearest competing station. Regions 
with higher market concentration and/or smaller number of stations are usually expected 
to be more likely to sustain tacit collusion.   
- Intertemporal fluctuations in the tacitly collusive price 
Unstable demand and costs conditions (highly volatile Rotterdam spot price) in retail 
gasoline industry make it difficult to sustain collusion and simultaneously respond to 
demand and wholesale price changes. In the long run, according to supergame models of 
tacit collusion, prices also change with respect to expected future collusive profits, i.e. 
increase when demand is expected to increase or marginal costs are expected to decline 
(Borenstein, Shepard, 1996).   
In order to maintain price “stability” and prevent possible price wars a number of 
strategies exist. Price rigidity (or stickiness) and price signaling (leadership) can be 
worth mentioning in our case. Price rigidity appears when firms are reluctant to change 
price in response to the cost changes, because that can send the wrong message to their 
competitors, and either set off a round of price warfare or lead to the loss of a market 
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share, depending on the direction of a change (Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 1998). The stickiness 
of prices and their symmetry with respect to spot market prices (prevailing of upward 
price flexibility) is a well-known phenomenon and can be interpreted as a sign of 
collusive behavior (Asplund, et. al., 2000).  
Price signaling is yet another form of implicit collusion. One firm (a leader) can set the 
price, and the other firms, the “price followers”, follow suit. Sometimes a large firm 
naturally acts as leader, and sometimes different firms can be the leader in different 
points in time. Price signaling can be a way of dealing with price rigidity problem. 
One of the forms of intertemporal price discrimination is the practice of charging 
different retail prices in different days of the week (“day-of-the-week-effect”) or 
holidays. Some studies show (Bettendorf et al., 2003) that the day of the week for which 
prices are observed matters for the results of statistical analysis on price response to 
costs changes. 
- Price regulations 
In competitive markets gasoline retailers are not restricted in their pricing behavior by 
the maximum price, introduced by major Norwegian oil companies on their franchisees. 
The latter should normally offer a discount vis-à-vis the maximum price. The size of 
such discounts depends on the degree of competition in a particular local market. 
According to the tacit collusion model, such maximum price agreements as well as 
recommended price publishing can facilitate coordination on a collusive price or set of 
retail prices, which will be close to or equal to the maximum/recommended price 
(Meerbeeck, 2003).    
2.3 Imperfect non-collusive competition  
A third possible model explaining price dispersion over space and time is imperfect non-
collusive competition (INC).  
In the case of uniform population density and diminished spatial differentiation with many 
independently owned homogenous outlets everywhere in the market, this model would lead 
to spaceless Bertrand competition and produce price uniformity in the market. In the absence 
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of such high station density or unequal spacing between them (which is closer to the real 
world picture) prices would differ according to costs, station ownership, local demand, and 
the number, location and types of local competitors (Eckert, et al., 2005). Therefore, this 
model generally predicts price variation across space, with the possible exception of price 
uniformity within the member outlets of a retail chain. The latter can, for example, happen 
because price is advertised across the entire market or imposed on chain members directly, 
etc., but not as a result of tacit collusion. However, different chains would have different 
uniform prices (Eckert, et al., 2005). 
2.4 Existing evidence on retail gasoline pricing   
Many recent international studies focus on gasoline price movements and variate 
dependency through time (serial correlation) and space (spatial autocorrelation), and with 
problems associated with processes that generate such dependency (Haining, 1984). M. 
Slade (1987), Borenstein and Shepard (1996), Eckert and West (2005) and some other 
authors have addressed the question whether recent game theoretic models are compatible 
with observed price movements in gasoline markets. A few empirical studies concentrate 
specifically on spatial aspects of competition (Meerbeeck 2003, Haining 1984, Sen 2003, 
Clemenz and Gugler 2002), while others (Asplund, Eriksson and Friberg 2000) are 
concerned with price adjustments in response to cost changes. Several researches (Slade 
1996, Meerbeeck 2003) have used data from gasoline markets to assess the impact of policy 
measures and certain contractual agreements on retail gasoline prices.  
Although these studies investigate many other western markets for gasoline, so far very little 
attention has been paid to the Norwegian petrol market. The oil companies operating on this 
market are present in almost all other countries, but peculiarities of both local regulations 
and local market structure makes this a special case.     
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3. Market and data description 
3.1 The market   
Vertical integration is prevailing in the Norwegian gasoline market, and gasoline is sold 
exclusively by relatively few branded retail stations. Oil companies have a very dense retail 
network and meet each other in most local markets in Norway. Available data relating to 
sales of gasoline during the last years indicate that Statoil and Shell appear to be the market 
leaders in terms of volume, having 20-30% market share each (Case No Comp/M.3375). 
They are closely followed by Esso and HydroTexaco, whose market shares are exceeding 
15-25% (figure 3.1). The share of ConocoPhillips, which is represented in Norway with its 
automatic station brand Jet, hardly exceeds 5% of the market and located mostly in the Oslo-
area. Regarding the number of retail stations, Shell has the largest number of gas stations 
(25-35%). All other parties’ share of the total number of retail stations (except minor share 
of ConocoPhillips) exceeds 15-25% (Case No Comp/M.3375).  
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Figure 3.1. Market shares in 2004 (Source: Norsk Petroleumsinstitutt). 
Three out of five companies (Shell, Hydro-Texaco and ConocoPhillips) active on the 
Norwegian retail gasoline market also operate chains of fully automated gas stations (Smart, 
UnoX and Jet respectively). Lower expenses due to smaller start-up and operating costs and 
shorter supply chains lead to a situation where automatic stations can offer a lower range of 
prices for the same type of gasoline as full service stations do, even despite the fact that they 
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sell less variety of goods, to which they can allocate these costs. After having made thorough 
research, the Norwegian competition authority (Konkurransetilsynet) decided that these 
stations constitute the same market for sale of gasoline as full service stations operating 
under the company’s names do, in spite of lower prices and different service level at 
automatic stations. Research also shows (Konkurransetilsynet, 1998) that in geographical 
areas where both types of stations are operating, price level for gasoline falls, but full service 
stations can still survive due to the fact that gasoline is not fully homogenous good.     
Most of the stations belonging to the four dominating retail chains for sale of gasoline 
operate under franchise agreements, where station owners decide on retail prices. Although 
all these oil companies have a minor share of stations, which is still driven directly by the 
head offices. For Shell, for example, this share accounts for about 25% of outlets, while for 
Esso it does not exceed 5% (Konkurransetilsynet, 2001).  
In order to encourage local competition, all major oil companies set maximum retail prices 
station owners can charge (Konkurransetilsynet, 2001). They also recommend particular 
retail prices to their filling stations, and Statoil, Shell and HydroTexaco publish changes to 
the recommended prices on their websites.  
We concentrated our attention on the retail list prices of Statoil. Statoil is a vertically 
integrated firm and its geographic market for gasoline at retail level is national in scope. In 
the year 2004 Statoil Detaljhandel Skandinavia AS (SDS), which operates the chain of retail 
service stations, was fully acquired by Statoil ASA. The latter is active in exploration and 
production of oil and natural gas, petroleum refining and delivering gasoline to the retail 
markets. At the wholesale level SDS sources gasoline solely from Statoil ASA (Case No 
Comp/M.3375). Although at retail level all four major companies have bilateral agreements 
for wholesale supply of gasoline to their retail stations. Since these oil companies do not 
own gasoline depots in every area, their branded stations in order to minimize transportation 
costs buy gasoline from the closest depot, even if it belongs to a competitive chain 
(Konkurransetilsynet, 1998). 
Important parameters of competition such as the price and the quality are typically decided 
and implemented by Statoil at the national level (Case No Comp/M.3375). Prices at national 
level, which Statoil recommends as a consumer price to all of its stations in Norway 
(www.statoil.no), are adjusted in response to cost and demand changes. Cost changes are 
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normally also reflected in the input (wholesale) price, even though usually with a 1-2 weeks 
time lag. Therefore, Daily Rotterdam Spot price for gasoline can be the relevant input price 
for our analysis; even firms who have their own refineries and do not buy gasoline on the 
spot market, use this price as a transfer price within a firm. 
Retail petrol prices are also influenced by costs of transportation of gasoline to a station 
from a depot (0-zone). It is interesting to see that the abolishment of the practice of 
“transportation costs equating” (“fraktutjevningsordningen”) introduced earlier by the 
authorities in order to keep retail gasoline prices at the same level all over the country by 
providing support to remote stations, did not lead to increased price differences between 
different zones.  
Due to such a short sample period (about 5 months), the Norwegian gasoline market 
remained stable with unchanged market concentration and relatively stable monthly sales of 
gasoline with insignificant seasonal fluctuations (figure 3.2). Therefore we did not consider 
such factors as change in market concentration and overall demand to be influential for a 
short-run pricing behavior. Taxes on gasoline also remained unchanged during this period, 
and according to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance constituted on average 4.74 NOK per 
liter of unleaded gasoline with low concentration of sulphur (varying slightly in different 
municipalities). Value-added tax also remained stable during the period and constituted 
25%, calculated on the consumer price.   
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Figure 3.2. Monthly Norwegian sales of gasoline in the period January-May in 
2002-2005 (Source: Statistisk sentralbyrå).  
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3.2 The data   
We study the retail price of unleaded gasoline (Euro 95) in Bergen, Norway, in the period 
from 23 January 2005 to 22 May 2005.  
In our research we consider five different retail gas stations, located in Bergen area. They 
belong to three major brands: Statoil, Hydro-Texaco (with its “UnoX” automatic stations) 
and Shell (with its “Smart” automatic stations). Since markets for gasoline for Norwegian 
oil companies are both local and national, in order to verify the hypothesis about the 
competition structure we chose two relatively isolated in terms of closest competitors 
geographical areas of Bergen: Sandviken and Askøy, both of which contained a Statoil 
station. Stations located in Sandviken lay on the major route (E39) with a lot of traffic 
during the week days, while Askøy is a residential area.    
The data set includes list prices collected twice a day (in the morning and in the evening) at 
three gas stations in Sandviken (Statoil, UnoX and Smart) and daily (mostly morning) list 
prices for two gas stations on Askøy (Statoil and Hydro-Texaco).  
Since Statoil has different competitors in these two areas, it gives us a perfect opportunity to 
follow and compare its pricing patterns at different gas stations and later make conclusions 
about the influence of different parameters. The fact that list prices were highly volatile and 
different for both Statoil’s stations is valuable for our analysis. It might expose the influence 
of strategic factors along with the response to cost changes on the pricing decisions of the 
retail stations. 
Further data is complemented by recommended Statoil retail prices and daily Rotterdam spot 
price, which as we already mentioned, is the most important input for the price of Euro 95. 
Every day (except weekends and holidays) the latter is assessed by Platt’s London in US 
dollars. To convert this price in Norwegian Krones, we use the daily dollar/NOK exchange 
rate given by Norges Bank.  
Summary statistics of collected data is given in Table 5.7.      
Beneath in the figure 3.3, time-series data for Statoil over the considered period is plotted.    
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Figure 3.3. Development of Statoil’s retail and recommended price for Euro 95 (excluding 
VAT) and marginal cost + tax (January – May 2005) (Sources: www.statoil.no, display 
boards of individual gas stations, Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government 
(EIA)). 
Despite daily fluctuations in the Rotterdam spot price and the exchange rate (green line), the 
recommended price (pink line) was held constant in the short run. While in the longer run 
the price seemed to follow the cost movements, adjusting in the direction motivated by the 
underlying cost. This phenomenon is called price stickiness. According to Asplund (2000), a 
recurring theme in literature is whether price adjustments are symmetric with respect to 
underlying variable. 
Retail prices at the given Statoil stations showed much higher volatility over time (on 
average local list prices at Statoil as well as at the other stations under consideration were 
adjusted once per day). Following the logic, under tacit collusion condition, retail prices 
would probably be close to the recommended price exceeding it on a value equal to the area 
transportation cost (4-5 øre excluding VAT for Bergen, www.shell.no), or be higher than 
recommended price, converging to maximum price under agreement between the company 
and a gas station. In our case they were generally lower than the recommended price, more 
or less following movements of the latter in their maximum states (during particular days of 
almost each week) (figure 3.3).  
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Except for a response to the corresponding fluctuations in international crude oil prices, 
retail gasoline price volatility can be explained by the degree of competition in retail and 
wholesale markets, which mainly depends on firm’s market concentration and the number 
and nature of competitors.  
Slade (1986), for example, distinguishes between two types of players in the market: price 
cutters (usually independent firms in US and Canada or automatic stations as in our case) 
and majors, who lead price restorations. Competition between these two types of players can 
cause high price volatility within a week. In some other cases the situation can be explained 
by an unleashed price war.  
Such high volatility of prices on a daily basis can also sometimes be explained by the “day-
of-the-week” effect – different price setting strategies of the companies during the week 
(mostly being different for weekends) (Bettendorf et al., 2003). Therefore, we want to 
account for this factor in our econometric model by introducing dummy variables for 
different days of the week.  
From figures 3.4 and 3.5 it is evident that price movements at different stations located in the 
same area often follow each other.  
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Figure 3.4. Development of retail price (excluding VAT) at Statoil, UnoX and Smart gas 
stations in NHH area, Sandviken (January – May 2005). 
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Figure 3.5. Development of retail price (excluding VAT) at Statoil and HydroTexaco gas 
stations in Askøy area (January – May 2005). 
From these figures we can presuppose that variation in prices in the same area refers more to 
constant differences in price levels than to differences in the pattern of price adjustments.  
We shall check for all these assumptions in our empirical analysis in the following chapter. 
In general we can say that the market offered us a clean case for testing hypothesis of 
stations’ tacit collusive behavior, as both prices and costs were observable on a daily basis at 
different individual gas stations as well as at the company level. Although some researches 
(Borenstein and Shepard, 1996) point out that diagnosing collusive pricing from only 
contemporaneous price, cost and demand data is quite difficult, and special restrictive 
assumptions are needed to be introduced in the model. 
 26 
4. Econometric model 
This section sets up an empirical specification, which will be used to describe the effects of 
wholesale prices, recommended prices and competition on Statoil retail prices, and to test 
certain predictions about these effects made by the tacitly collusive hypothesis. Because of 
the localized nature of competition (station’s principal competitors are its closest neighbors, 
Slade 1986) and small number of stations, at which prices were observed, in order to assess 
these effects we specified one regression equation for each of two Statoil stations (one for 
each area).  
The price of gasoline at each Statoil station at particular day is a function of rival price, the 
firm’s recommended price, input price (Rotterdam spot price for gasoline) and price at other 
Statoil stations in the city at the corresponding day t: 
1. Sandviken (NHH) area:    
P(StatoilNHH)t = β0 + β1P(Smart)t + β2P(UnoX)t + β3P(Statoilrecommended)t +     
      + β4P(Rotterdam)t + β5P(StatoilAskøy)t + ε1t  …   (1) 
2. Askøy area: 
P(StatoilAskøy)t = γ0 + γ1P(HydroTexaco)t + γ2P(Statoilrecommended)t + 
     + γ3P(Rotterdam)t + γ4P(StatoilNHH)t + ε2t             …  (2), 
   where εt is an error term;  
   β0 and γ0 are zero intercepts; 
   and β1-β5 and γ1-γ4 – coefficients, which measure the effect of corresponding 
   independent variable on the dependent variable, holding other factors fixed.   
By including P(Smart)t, P(UnoX)t and P(HydroTexaco)t into the model, we test the impact of 
retail spatial competition with respect to retail gasoline prices. By analyzing coefficient 
estimates for these variables, we can make a judgment about how much prices at local 
competing stations contribute to retail price changes.   
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We use P(Rotterdam)t in order to capture supply side fluctuations in retail prices. To account 
for fact that retail prices do not adjust to changes in input prices instantly, we also use lagged 
variables for Rotterdam Spot price by 1 and 2 weeks. Coefficient estimates of P(Rotterdam)t 
and its lagged values should reveal how much of retail price changes are due to Rotterdam 
Spot price fluctuations.  
By including P(Statoilrecommended)t and daily prices at another Statoil station - P(StatoilNHH)t or 
P(StatoilAskøy)t, into the model, we test the impact of company’s common policy regarding 
retail price level. Intuitively, these parameters should share a positive relationship with retail 
prices at Statoil stations.  
In order to check for the “day-of-the-week effect”, which can cause high retail price 
volatility, we further introduce dummy variables for the each weekday into the equations.  
Due to data limitations we omit demand side determinants in the model. We should note that 
ignoring this factor may bias the expected causal relationship between retail gasoline prices 
and corresponding measures of local competition (Sen, 2003). For example, retail prices may 
be higher simply because of increased demand and not due to collusion between retailers. 
Since we have only two areas with a small number of stations, it is meaningless to 
incorporate all multiple environmental factors into our regression model. Therefore, we shall 
also introduce rather descriptive comparison of the areas, based on parameters discussed 
below, and try to make logical conclusions about the influence of these parameters, based on 
paired t-tests for all stations and intertemporal statistical analysis of their price adjustments. 
From this we can also get some idea on the correlation between average retail prices and the 
number and nature of competitors.    
4.1 Brands   
Even though all stations under consideration belong to three major brands, we would 
distinguish automatic stations Smart and UnoX from the Major ones, since they operate 
under different names than their parent brands and have different marketing and pricing 
concepts, which help them to be perceived differently by customers. They are also 
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sometimes referred to, by Norwegian Competition Authority, as a different niche of the 
market. 
Majors (Statoil and HydroTexaco) would have a greater incentive to set the tacitly collusive 
price, so one would expect them to have a higher probability of matching the price than 
automatic stations. INC does not predict brand specific differences in the pricing behavior 
(Eckert, et al., 2005). 
4.2 Contracts 
Whether it is a station dealer (operator) or station supplier, who set the station’s price, is 
dependent upon a contractual arrangement: a station can be operated under a franchising 
agreement or by the oil company (a supplier) directly. Although even when lessee has 
nominal control over price setting, a major company has some degree of control as well in 
form of pricing power at the wholesale level (which can especially be valuable during price 
wars), maximum price agreements and so on.  
We do not have data about the contract type used by each of our stations, but we know that 
all of them are major brand stations that are predicted to have pricing power at the supplier 
level (Eckert, et al., 2005).  
In comparison to the competitive model, tacit collusion and INC models suggest that in case 
when all stations belong to major brands and different brands are clustered in the same 
location (our case), it can create price matching inside and across local areas. For us it is 
difficult to check the influence of this parameter in full degree, since all stations fall in the 
same group.  
4.3 Traffic flows 
The competitive model would predict that stations that are not on big roads would charge the 
same price as stations on the major routes. In turn tacit collusion model predicts that 
collusive pricing is more important for stations located along the major roads, since their 
prices are easily observable and for whom undercutting would attract the largest market 
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share from rivals (Eckert, et al., 2005). INC states that station location on major roads results 
in more intensive competition and, therefore, leads to higher variability and dispersion of 
prices. 
4.4 Degree of local market concentration and competition 
As we have already mentioned, according to the competitive market model, neither the 
number of closely situated competing outlets, nor the proportion of stations belonging to 
major brands among local competitors, should have any impact on price matching. Tacit 
collusion model states that collusive pricing is more probable in areas with fewer local 
competitors and in areas dominated by majors (Eckert, et al., 2005). According to the INC 
model, the more stations are located in the area, the less price matching signs can be 
observed; but with the increase of a majors’ share among competing stations, probability of 
matching rises. 
4.5 Day-of-the-week effect 
Seven week day dummy variables are added to our regression in order to control for the day-
of-the-week effect (D1-D7). A day-of-the-week effect should not be significant in the 
competitive market model. Under the tacit collusion hypothesis and INC model, different 
week days and especially weekends can have distinctive implication for retail prices. First, 
since consumers are not commuting on weekends, they can be less price aware. Second, 
demand could be higher on weekends (especially in residential areas), which could 
encourage stations either to undercut rivals to gain bigger market share, or increase the 
incentive to charge higher prices (Eckert, et al., 2005). Both arguments would lead to higher 
price dispersion in weekends in comparison to other weekdays. The weekend effect could 
also affect Mondays and Fridays, since these are the days when stations change to/from the 
weekend mode, something that can also lead to high price dispersion and volatility. Monday 
is also considered to be a day with high demand, which can enhance the mentioned 
consequences even more. 
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4.6 Margins 
Margin estimates the distance between before-tax retail price and wholesale price. Eckert 
(2005) argues that the greater the distance between a tacitly collusive price and marginal 
cost, the greater the temptation to deviate. Since we do not have data for the wholesale prices 
in the Bergen area, we can’t estimate the periods when margins were higher. However, 
considering that stations are purchasing gasoline from the same depot, under condition of 
bilateral agreements marginal costs should be similar for all stations. Therefore, we can 
estimate relative size of margins for different gas stations by comparing prices.  
INC does not give clear predictions concerning this parameter, while the competitive model 
suggests that this factor has no effect on pricing behavior. 
4.7 Past behavior 
Time series variation is controlled in our analysis in several ways. We introduce two lagged 
variables for Rotterdam Spot price (7 days and 14 days) into our regression equation, as 
according to Borenstein and Shepard (1996) estimate, about two-thirds of the eventual pass-
through of Rotterdam Spot prices occurs in the first two weeks following the change.  
4.8 Station characteristics 
As opposed to the competitive market model, which suggests that price is the only factor 
consumers take into consideration when purchasing gasoline, and station and product 
characteristics do not affect whether station exhibits price matching behavior, the tacitly 
collusive and INC pricing may depend on station characteristics.  
Since we have only five stations, we distinguish only on one scale - type of station: full-
service versus automatic. This division coincides with one we made according to the station 
brand; therefore it will be hard to make conclusions whether automatic stations choose a 
pricing model on the ground of their service level or due to the fact that they have 
completely different brand perception in customers’ eyes based on a wide spectrum of 
factors.  
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In a tacit collusion model deviations from tacitly collusive price due to station’s 
characteristics could lead to a breakdown of tacit collusion. Therefore, the latter should not 
affect the price (Eckert, et al., 2005). For INC station characteristics could affect pricing 
behavior, although it is hard to predict in what way since it would depend on the nature of 
the competition.  
There is also a number of variables (such as station capacity, population income, distances 
between stations, etc.), effects of which are found to be significant in the literature, but 
which can’t be incorporated in our model due to the data limitations. 
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5. Estimation results 
5.1 Estimating linear regressions for Statoil stations 
5.1.1 StatoilNHH 
Table 5.1 contains empirical estimates of the impact of competition, the company and input 
prices on average daily retail prices at StatoilNHH station, based on Equation (1). 
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
variables      
            
P(UnoX)t 0.3140 (0.1857)**   0.0098 (0.1951)     
P(Smart)t 0.7213(0.1858)***   0.5726 (0.1782)*** 0.4540 (0.1248)*** 0.6010 (0.1250)*** 
P(StatoilAskøy)t      0.2281 (0.0959)*** 0.2888 (0.1032)*** 0.2015 (0.0925)*** 
P(Statoilrecommended)t    0.8736(0.4139)*** -0.0278 (0.2256) 0.3205 (0.3673) 0.0252 (0.1807) 
P(Rotterdam)t    0.4185 (0.4149) 0.2620 (0.2779)     
P(Rotterdam)t-7   -1.0591 (0.4421)***  -0.6511 (0.3507)**   
P(Rotterdam)t-14   0.7482 (0.2780)***  0.5831 (0.2315)***   
Monday dummy        1.7228 (0.9174)* 
Tuesday dummy        1.5560 (0.9514)* 
Wednesday dummy        1.4578 (0.9502)*** 
Thursday dummy        1.5990 (0.9629) 
Friday dummy        1.4885 (0.9438)*** 
Saturday dummy        1.4218 (0.9429)*** 
Sunday dummy        1.3942 (0.9423)*** 
        
Adjusted R2 0.9990 0.9988 0.9991 0.9992 0.7200 
constant included no no no no yes 
 
Table 5.1. Impact of competition, the company and input prices (Spot Rotterdam price + 
tax) on average daily retail prices (excluding VAT) at StatoilNHH station. 
Standard errors of coefficient estimates, showed in parentheses, were Newey-West corrected for seventh order 
autocorrelation. *** denotes significance at the 1% level  ** denotes significance at the 5% level  * denotes 
significance at the 10% level 
Column 1 of the table evaluates the impact of local market competition (UnoX and Smart) 
on average daily retail prices at StatoilNHH station in isolation from other potential factors. 
Similarly, column 2 examines the effects of Statoil recommended prices and Rotterdam 
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input prices (including tax) and their one and two weeks lagged values on average daily 
retail prices. Column 3 combines local market competition, the company’s recommended 
prices, prices at other gas stations, belonging to the same brand, and input prices. In column 
4 we refit the model, dropping two predictors - P(UnoX)t  and P(Rotterdam)t. Coefficient for 
P(UnoX)t has the highest t-probability and statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
Coefficients for P(Rotterdam)t and P(Statoilrecommended)t are both statistically insignificant and 
have almost perfect correlation (0.953) (Table 5.2): 
 P(UnoX) P(Smart) P(StatoilAskøy) P(StatoilRecom.) P(Rotterdam) 
P(UnoX) 1.0000     
P(Smart) -0.7445 1.0000    
P(StatoilAskøy) -0.1252 -0.1468 1.0000   
P(Statoilrecom.) -0.1066 -0.0980 -0.2088 1.0000  
P(Rotterdam) -0.0002 0.0571 0.0999 -0.9533 1.0000 
 
Table 5.2. Matrix of Pearson product-moment correlations between predictors for equation 
(1), column 3 in Table 5.1.   
Such high correlation indicates a possible multicollinearity problem among these variables. 
By estimating variance inflation factor (VIF) in STATA before and after excluding 
P(Rotterdam)t from the equation, it becomes evident that the existing problem of  
multicollinearity can be avoided by dropping this predictor. In this case the largest VIF 
drops from 10.15 down to acceptable level of 6.68 (we consider tolerance criterion to be 10).   
Finally, the day-of-the-week effect is accounted for in column 5 by including seven dummy 
variables for each week day. 
Column 1 demonstrates that average retail daily prices at competing gas stations Smart and 
UnoX are significantly and positively associated with average retail daily prices at 
StatoilNHH. Specifically, a 1 NOK increase in each of the retail prices is significantly 
associated with 1.0353 NOK increase in daily retail prices at Statoil gas station. Further, the 
adjusted R2 implies that prices at Smart and UnoX explain 99.90% of total variation in 
StatoilNHH prices. However, high R-values are typical for the equations without a constant 
(adjusted R2 value for the same regression with a constant reached only 0.6364). Norusis 
(2003) also stresses that in general high R-values are typical for the time-series data and 
especially in periods of instability.      
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The empirical results contained in column 2 suggest that Statoil recommended price and 
Rotterdam input prices explain somewhat smaller amount of the total variation in average 
daily StatoilNHH prices. The coefficient estimates of Statoil recommended prices as well as 
current and 2 weeks lagged input prices have the expected positive signs. However, the 
coefficient estimate of current Rotterdam input prices is statistically insignificant, which can 
be explained by lags in the response of retail prices to Rotterdam Spot price and presumably 
by discussed above high correlation between two used predictors - current Rotterdam input 
prices and Statoil recommended prices. The coefficient estimate of 1 week lagged input 
prices possesses a statistically significant but counter-intuitive negative sign. This could be 
the result of several factors. First, some authors (Sen, 2003) explain it by shifts in demand in 
response to changing retail prices. We think that 1 week is too short time period for such 
long term trends. Another possible explanation comes from Borenstein and Shepard (1996) 
estimate, which shows that about two-thirds of the eventual pass-through of Rotterdam Spot 
prices occurs in the first two weeks following the change. Therefore, next week marginal 
costs (wholesale prices) can be influenced by the Spot price from the last week. According 
to Borenstein and Shepard (1996), unexpected negative relationship between 1 week lagged 
input prices and today’s retail prices can be explained by the presence of collusion 
mechanism - the station shows an intention to enter tacit cooperation over prices by 
maintaining or even increasing the price when expected next week costs are lower (as 
tomorrow’s punishment will exceed today’s gain of defecting) and defects by lowering the 
price when future costs are higher (as in this case the current gain from defecting is greater 
than the anticipated future loss from the punishment triggered by the defection). They also 
mention that there is a reason to believe that non-collusive margins would also respond to 
expected future costs changes, but change in costs would change collusive margins more 
than non-collusive ones due to the prediction that margin will respond negatively. In our 
case the coefficient for 1 week lagged input price has the largest value in column 2 and is 
significant at the 1% level.  
Although in our opinion, the most probable explanation to the described situation could be 
the presence of the day-of-the-week effect, which will be more thoroughly discussed in next 
subchapter under analysis of daily retail price adjustments during a week. 
Column 3 combines local market competition factors, company’s factors – daily retail prices 
at another Statoil station on Askøy and current input prices. Not surprisingly, the precision 
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and magnitude of coefficient estimates of most of these variables are reduced. At the same 
time the explanatory power of the regression grows. This suggests that coefficient estimates 
from studies, which do not control the effects of local market competition and input prices as 
well as the company’s influence may be biased because of omitted variables. The most 
abrupt change occurs with the coefficient estimates of P(Statoilrecommended)t, which decreases 
by about 103% (from 0.8736 to -0.0278) and becomes insignificant, and P(UnoX)t, which 
decreases by around 97% and also becomes insignificant at the 10% level.   
The estimation power of the regression in column 4 grows after we have dropped P(UnoX)t 
(due to its highest t-probability) and P(Rotterdam)t (due to its almost perfect correlation with 
P(Statoilrecommended)t and low t-statistics), and included two lagged variables for 
P(Rotterdam)t, magnitude and precision of which were significant in previous equations. Out 
of all variables in column 4, only P(Statoilrecommended)t remains insignificant. This means that 
daily retail prices at competing gas stations (Smart), daily retail prices at gas stations 
belonging to the same chain (P(StatoilAskøy)t) and one and two weeks lagged input prices are 
statistically significant determinants of trends in average retail prices at StatoilNHH. All these 
variables are consistently significant and all of them except 1 week lagged input price, 
possess theoretically plausible coefficient signs. Coefficient estimates indicate that at 
StatoilNHH an increase in retail price at competing gas station Smart by 1 NOK/l is 
significantly associated with 0.45 NOK/l increase in daily average retail prices, and increase 
in retail price at another Statoil gas station by 1 NOK/l is significantly associated with 0.29 
NOK/l increase in daily average retail prices. Coefficient estimates of 2 weeks lagged input 
Rotterdam prices suggest that within 2 weeks only about half of 1 NOK/l increase in input 
prices is passed onto daily average retail prices at StatoilNHH. 
Finally, column 5 accounts for day of the week effect. Average daily retail prices at 
StatoilNHH after controlling for the prices at neighboring gas station Smart, another Statoil 
gas station on Askøy and Statoil recommended price, are significantly higher on Mondays 
and lower (descending down to Sunday) during all other days of the week except Thursdays, 
coefficient for which is insignificant. Test if day-of-the-week, taken as a whole, significantly 
contributes toward the explanatory power of the regression, shows that even at 1% level we 
can reject the hypothesis that, taken together, day-of-the-week has no effect on the gasoline 
price at StatoilNHH gas station (F-statistics for the test is 5.95).  
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Estimating regressions for two StatoilNHH‘s different data sets – one with only morning and 
another with only evening retail prices, reveals some interesting results (Table 5.3 and 5.4).   
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
variables      
            
P(UnoX)t 0.4636 (0.1420)***   0.2830 (0.1409)** 0.1949 (0.1384) 0.2598 (0.0648)** 
P(Smart)t 0.5743 (0.1389)***   0.2997 (0.1732)** 0.2857 (0.1886)** 0.3582 (0.1257)*** 
P(StatoilAskøy)t      0.2686 (0.0955)*** 0.2915 (0.1077)*** 0.2635 (0.0971)*** 
P(Statoilrecommended)t    0.7537 (0.3855)** -0.1796 (0.2654) 0.2209 (0.3448) -0.1093 (0.1594) 
P(Rotterdam)t    0.4915 (0.3789) 0.3957 (0.3130)    
P(Rotterdam)t-7   -0.9453 (0.4297)***  -0.5097 (0.3683)   
P(Rotterdam)t-14   0.7006 (0.2747)***  0.5284 (0.2747)**   
Monday dummy       2.2000 (0.8616)** 
Tuesday dummy        1.9959 (0.8648)** 
Wednesday dummy        1.9509 (0.8730)* 
Thursday dummy        2.1028 (0.8852)** 
Friday dummy        2.0245 (0.8647)** 
Saturday dummy        1.8888 (0.8588)* 
Sunday dummy        1.8892 (0.8569)* 
       
Adjusted R2 0.9988 0.9988 0.9990 0.9991 0.9992 
constant included no no no no no 
 
Table 5.3. Impact of competition, the company and input prices (Spot Rotterdam price + 
tax) on daily morning retail prices (excluding VAT) at StatoilNHH station.  
Standard errors of coefficient estimates, showed in parentheses, were Newey-West corrected for seventh order 
autocorrelation. *** denotes significance at the 1% level ** denotes significance at the 5% level * denotes 
significance at the 10% level 
Analysis reveals that StatoilNHH‘s morning prices show more correlation with morning prices 
of UnoX and prices of StatoilAskøy, and less correlation with morning Smart prices than we 
can see for the evening prices. The precision and magnitude of coefficient estimates of 
P(UnoX) and P(StatoilAskøy) grow essentially for all regression runs for the morning dataset, 
and due to this fact the magnitude of coefficient estimates of P(Smart) decreases. Since data 
for StatoilAskøy was collected once a day and mostly in the mornings, it is consistent that 
there is more correlation between daily retail prices at StatoilAskøy and StatoilNHH‘s morning 
retail prices than between prices at StatoilAskøy and StatoilNHH‘s evening prices.  
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Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
variables      
            
P(UnoX)t 0.3465 (0.1542)***   0.2157  (0.1555)* 0.1334 (0.1727) 0.2547 (0.0909)** 
P(Smart)t 0.6887 (0.1511)***   0.5469  (0.1734)*** 0.4788 (0.1838)*** 0.5198 (0.1212)*** 
P(StatoilAskøy)t     0.0978 (0.0991) 0.1882 (0.0926)** 0.0912 (0.0839) 
P(Statoilrecommended)t    0.9640 (0.4476)*** 0.0333 (0.1885) 0.3619 (0.3712) -0.0061 (0.2056) 
P(Rotterdam)t    0.3953 (0.4558) 0.1436 (0.2112)   
P(Rotterdam)t-7   -1.1559 (0.4609)***  -0.6360 (0.4107)**  
P(Rotterdam)t-14   0.7619 (0.2868)***  0.4610 (0.2454)**  
Monday dummy       1.5920 (0.9853)* 
Tuesday dummy        1.3522 (1.0139)*** 
Wednesday dummy        1.2998 (1.0090)*** 
Thursday dummy        1.4298 (1.0211)** 
Friday dummy        1.2200 (1.0034)*** 
Saturday dummy        1.2133 (1.0045)*** 
Sunday dummy        1.2213 (1.0011)*** 
       
Adjusted R2 0.9990 0.9987 0.9990 0.9991 0.7476 
constant included no no no no yes 
 
Table 5.4. Impact of competition, the company and input prices (Spot Rotterdam price + 
tax) on daily evening retail prices (excluding VAT) at StatoilNHH station.  
Standard errors of coefficient estimates, showed in parentheses, were Newey-West corrected for seventh order 
autocorrelation. *** denotes significance at the 1% level ** denotes significance at the 5% level * denotes 
significance at the 10% level 
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5.1.2 StatoilAskøy 
Table 5.5 contains empirical estimates of the impact of competition, the company and input 
prices on daily retail prices at StatoilAskøy station, based on Equation (2). 
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
variables      
            
P(HydroTexaco)t 0.6960 (0.1245)***  0.6775 (0.0970)*** 0.6104 (0.1207)*** 0.5815 (0.1104)*** 
P(StatoilNHHaverage)t  0.3148 (0.1241)***  0.2728 (0.1475)*** 0.3415 (0.2015)*** 0.2402 (0.1481)*** 
P(Statoilrecommended)t   1.4149 (0.6695)*** 0.5915 (0.2850)** 0.2696 (0.3003) 0.3061 (0.1250)* 
P(Rotterdam)t   -0.0655 (0.6360) -0.6167 (0.3177)**    
P(Rotterdam)t-7  -0.6240 (0.4631)*  0.0340 (0.3856)   
P(Rotterdam)t-14  0.1681 (0.3792)  -0.2836 (0.2388)   
Monday dummy     -1.0972 (0.8791) 
Tuesday dummy     -0.8946 (0.8596)** 
Wednesday dummy     -1.1176 (0.9037) 
Thursday dummy     -1.0518 (0.9054) 
Friday dummy     -1.0549 (0.8633) 
Saturday dummy     -1.0964 (0.8604) 
Sunday dummy     -1.0912 (0.8606) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.9992 0.9983 0.9992 0.9992 0.7583 
constant included no no no no yes 
      
 
Table 5.5. Impact of competition, the company and input prices (Spot Rotterdam price + 
tax) on daily retail prices (excluding VAT) at StatoilAskøy station. 
Standard errors of coefficient estimates, showed in parentheses, were Newey-West corrected for seventh order 
autocorrelation. *** denotes significance at the 1% level ** denotes significance at the 5% level * denotes 
significance at the 10% level 
Column 1 of the table evaluates the impact of local market competition (HydroTexaco) and 
the company - prices at another gas station, belonging to the same brand (StatoilNHH), on 
average daily retail prices at StatoilNHH station in isolation from other potential factors. The 
high adjusted R2 value suggests that these two predictors are significant determinants of 
daily retail prices at StatoilAskøy station. Both coefficient estimates have the expected positive 
sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Coefficient estimate for 
P(HydroTexaco) (0.696), describing the effect of local market competition, is almost twice 
as high as coefficient estimate for StatoilNHH (0.3148).    
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Column 2 examines the effects of Statoil recommended prices and Rotterdam input prices 
(including tax) and their one and two weeks lagged values on average daily retail prices at 
StatoilAskøy station. The empirical results (adjusted R2 value) suggest that these factors 
explain much smaller amount of the total variation in daily retail prices than factors in 
previous column. Adjusted R2 value in column 2 for StatoilAskøy (0.9983) is also much lower 
than that for corresponding equation for StatoilNHH station (0.9988). Moreover, the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients differ. The coefficient estimate of Statoil 
recommended prices is positive and high (1.4149), while the coefficient estimates of current 
and 1 week lagged input prices have negative signs (from which only the coefficient for 1 
week lagged input prices is significant at the 10% level), and the coefficient estimate of 2 
weeks lagged input prices is positive but statistically insignificant. When analyzing the 
influence of Rotterdam input prices on retail prices at StatoilNHH, we have already discussed 
possible causes for such situation, which are also valid for this case.  
Column 3 combines local market competition factors (P(HydroTexaco), company’s factors – 
daily retail prices at another Statoil station at NHH as well as Statoil recommended prices, 
and current input prices. The precision and magnitude of coefficient estimates of the first 
two predictors as well as the explanatory power of the regression stay almost at the same 
level as in the column 1. This is surprising considering that we included two more factors 
into the model, coefficients for which, in addition, are shown to be comparatively large and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This situation can be caused by collinearity between 
the two last predictors, discussed earlier (table 5.6). 
Therefore, in column 4 we refit the model, dropping one predictor - P(Rotterdam)t, and also 
including both lagged variables for Rotterdam input price. The explanatory power of the 
regression stays the same, but coefficient estimates for Statoil recommended price and both 
lagged variables for Rotterdam input price become statistically insignificant. Moreover, 
coefficient for P(Statoilrecommended) reduces by about 54% (from 0.5915 to 0.2696), 1 week 
lag for the input price becomes positive (changes from -0.624 in column2 0.034) and 2 
weeks lag for the input price becomes negative (changing from 0.1681 in column 2 to -
0.2836). All said above means that daily retail prices at competing gas station HydroTexaco 
as well as daily retail prices at gas stations belonging to the same chain - StatoilNHH, are 
statistically significant determinants of trends in average retail prices at StatoilNHH. Both 
variables are consistently significant possessing theoretically plausible coefficient signs. 
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Coefficient estimates indicate that an increase in retail price at competing gas station 
HydroTexaco by 1 NOK/l is significantly associated with 0.61 NOK/l increase in daily 
average retail prices, and increase in retail price at another Statoil gas station (StatoilNHH) by 
1 NOK/l is significantly associated with 0.34 NOK/l increase in daily average retail prices. 
 P(HydroTexaco) P(StatoilNHH) P(StatoilRecom.) P(Rotterdam) 
P(HydroTexaco) 1.0000    
P(StatoilNHH) -0.2641 1.0000   
P(Statoilrecom.) -0.0716 -0.2016 1.0000  
P(Rotterdam) -0.1213 0.0166 -0.9512 1.0000 
 
Table 5.6. Matrix of Pearson product-moment correlations between predictors for equation 
(2), column 3 in Table 5.5.   
Day of the week effect is accounted for in column 5 of the table. Average daily retail prices 
at StatoilAskøy after controlling for the prices at neighboring gas station HydroTexaco, 
another Statoil gas station at NHH and Statoil recommended price, are significantly higher 
on Tuesdays than during all other days of the week. Coefficient estimates for dummy 
variables for all other days are statistically insignificant. Test if day-of-the-week, taken as a 
whole, significantly contributes toward the explanatory power of the regression, shows that 
even at 10% level we can not reject the hypothesis that, taken together, day-of-the-week has 
no effect on the gasoline price at StatoilAskøy gas station (F-statistics for the test is 1.58). 
These results differ from ones for NHH area, where day-of-the-week effect plays significant 
role. In column 5, the precision and magnitude of coefficient estimates of P(HydroTexaco) 
and P(StatoilNHH) variables are reduced, since coefficient estimate of Statoil recommended 
price grows up to 0.31 and becomes significant (even though only at the 10% level). 
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5.2 Relative prices 
Comparing summary statistics for retail prices at two considered Statoil gas stations (table 
5.7) we can see that prices fluctuated basically in the same range. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
NHH area          
Retail price at StatoilNHH 245 8.091 0.423 7.352 8.792
Retail price at UnoX 247 7.795 0.431 7.192 8.448
Retail price at Smart 196 7.742 0.429 7.192 8.656
Askøy area          
Retail price at StatoilAskøy 111 8.074 0.450 7.40 8.832
Retail price at HydroTexaco 102 7.926 0.429 7.16 8.792
           
Recommended Statoil retail price 124 8.412 0.224 7.984 8.776
Daily Spot Rotterdam price of gasoline 124 7.283 0.210 6.9757 7.7256
 
Table 5.7. Summary statistics for collected data. 
According to performed paired t-test and Levene’s test, there is no statistically significant 
difference between these two variables: we can not reject neither null hypothesis that means 
are equal when executing paired t-test, nor null hypothesis that variances are equal in 
Levene’s test. More information can be obtained from the analysis of price adjustments, 
performed in next subchapter.   
Results of consequent paired t-tests for each of Statoil gas stations and recommended Statoil 
price show that at the 1% level daily average retail prices at the gas stations are statistically 
different from recommended price and are smaller than the latter. The former also have 
higher variances than the latter, which can be explained by more frequent and large price 
adjustments (figure 3.3). 
At the same time consequent t-tests for gas stations in both areas show that at 1% confidence 
level average everyday prices at Statoil gas stations are higher than at all other gas stations 
in same area. Comparing UnoX and Smart stations we found that average Smart prices are 
higher. We can summarize findings as follows (the mean for each parameter, which stands in 
brackets beneath the parameter, can differ from one stated in summary statistics due to 
restrictions of t-tests – only days, in which both variables have data, are taken into 
consideration): 
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NHH area:   Pt (Statoilrecommended) > Pt (StatoilNHH) > Pt (Smart)  > Pt (UnoX) 
                                     (8.41)                            (8.09)               (7.73)            (7.66)     
 
 
Askøy:   Pt (Statoilrecommended) > Pt (StatoilAskøy) > Pt (HydroTexaco)  
                                   (8.41)                            (8.07)                (7.93) 
              
Between areas, according to paired t-tests: 
Pt (HydroTexaco) > Pt (Smart) > Pt (UnoX).  
Therefore, we can state that there is no constant difference in price levels between individual 
Statoil gas stations due to different local competition conditions in considered areas. We can 
also conclude that prices at automatic gas stations UnoX and Smart are on average lower 
than the prices at all full-service stations under consideration (two Statoil stations and 
HydroTexaco station).   
By executing paired t-tests, we found one interesting detail. When comparing UnoX and 
Smart average prices, STATA only took days, for which data for both stations was available. 
Since there were a lot of missing days for Smart stations due to the fact that their display 
board did not function, STATA excluded data for UnoX for those days also. As a result, the 
mean of prices at UnoX was lower. Although, if general analysis of data separately for each 
station is performed (“summarize” command in STATA), we can see that the mean of UnoX 
price is higher. It shows us that in days when display board of Smart did not work, and 
customers could not make comparisons (unless they came directly to the Smart’s pump) 
average prices at UnoX were higher than in other days. Although another possible 
explanation could be the level of Spot Rotterdam prices, which grew right before the period 
with missing data for Smart gas station. 
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5.3 Price adjustments 
In order to add to the evidence on the behaviour of prices, we perform a third step of 
analysis of local price variation, where we give a detailed description of the pattern of price 
adjustments. Summary statistics of price adjustments is given in table 5.8. 
       
 Variable No mean st.dev. min max adj>0 adj<0 
NHH area        
Retail price at StatoilNHH 74 0.0141 0.4420 -0.872 1.008 27 47 
Retail price at UnoX 59 0.0119 0.3843 -1.040 1.192 22 37 
Retail price at Smart 31 0.0119 0.3979 -0.856 0.856 10 21 
 
Askøy area        
Retail price at StatoilAskøy 44 0.0411 0.5576 -0.848 0.968 22 22 
Retail price at HydroTexaco 40 0.0314 0.5528 -1.064 1.064 19 21 
         
Recom. Statoil retail price 14 0.0394 0.1036 -0.120 0.144 9 5 
Daily Spot Rotterdam price  87 0.0042 0.0544 -0.127 0.124 46 41 
 
Table 5.8. Summary statistics of price adjustments. 
5.3.1 NHH area 
All gasoline stations in NHH area were checked for prices twice a day. Due to the fact that 
data for Askøy area as well as Rotterdam Spot price of gasoline could be obtained only on a 
daily basis, and connected to this comparability problem, we used daily average prices for 
StatoilNHH in our previous calculations. All days when prices at StatoilNHH were changed in 
the afternoon (28 cases) are therefore different from the original dataset. Moreover, we also 
created missing values, when periods with missing data did not exceed 1 day, by taking an 
average of prices in previous and subsequent day, but they were not included in the analysis 
of adjustments.    
There were totally 74 price adjustments in the sample period at StatoilNHH, implying that on 
average price was adjusted every 1.7 day. As it can be seen from figure 5.1, the size 
distribution of adjustments is not symmetrical: the center of symmetry is skewed to the left 
(small negative adjustments are more frequent) with the peak of around -0.05; while positive 
adjustments do not have peaks of frequencies and more smoothly distributed along the scale. 
Due to these facts, the mean of positive adjustments is almost twice as high (0.458/-0.241), 
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while the amount of them is almost twice as low. We think it might reflect discussed earlier 
day-of-the-week effect – large positive adjustments on Mondays and many smaller negative 
adjustments during the week as a result of competition influence.   
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Figure 5.1. Frequency distribution of StatoilNHH price adjustments. 
One more feature of the distribution is the minimum absolute size of adjustments, which is 
equal to about 0.008. In consumer price terms (including VAT) it is equal to 0.01 NOK (1 
øre). It is the minimum, which can be reflected on the display boards of the stations. It can 
serve as a proof to our earlier guess that there are no fixed costs associated with price 
changes or that they are very insignificant.    
At other gas stations from the same area (UnoX and Smart) the pattern of adjustments is 
similar (table 5.8). There are fewer price adjustments at these gas stations than at StatoilNHH 
(59 at UnoX and 31 adjustments at Smart). For Smart it can be partly explained by a huge 
gap in data due to technical reasons (Smart encountered some problems with their display 
board – our source of data). Similarly to StatoilNHH, negative adjustments were almost twice 
as frequent at both stations, and the mean of positive adjustments is nearly twice as high. It 
is worth mentioning that negative adjustments fluctuated in nearly same range (around 1 
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NOK) as positive adjustments for all three stations. It could be explained by several reasons. 
First, time period under consideration was too short for macro events such as inflation, tax 
changes, etc., to influence the positive (or otherwise, negative) range in a great degree. 
Second, no big disturbances of oil market happened during this period. Third, indirectly it 
can also prove the absence of price wars between the stations, which we will discuss later.  
5.3.2 Askøy area 
The picture for the second area, namely Askøy, differs from the one described above. The 
amount of positive adjustments at both stations was similar as the amount of negative 
adjustments; the mean of negative adjustments (-0.416 for StatoilAskøy and -0.425 for 
HydroTexaco) was just insignificantly lower than that of positive ones (0.499 for StatoilAskøy 
and 0.536 for HydroTexaco) - prices grew a little though the time.  
As it can be seen from figure 5.2, no particular pattern for the size distribution of 
adjustments can be seen. Although very small and very big adjustments are prevailing from 
both sides, there is no distinguished center of symmetry.   
It is hard to compare two different areas in terms of the amount of price adjustments, since 
prices were collected with different frequency. We can only say that due to the fact that there 
were almost twice as many price adjustments, which are on average about 3 times smaller, at 
StatoilNHH, the variance of their retail prices was statistically undistinguishable from 
variance of StatoilAskøy’s retail prices in previously performed Levene’s test.   
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Figure 5.2. Frequency distribution of StatoilAskøy price adjustments. 
 46 
 47
5.4 Distribution of price adjustments in time 
It is also useful to look into a distribution of adjustments in time (on different days of the 
week and monthly changes):    
Statoil NHH       
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Mon 17 0.403 0.346 -0.16 0.872 16 1 
Tue 15 -0.194 0.394 -0.736 0.864 1 14 
Wed 11 -0.302 0.323 -0.872 0.04 2 9 
Thu 12 0.248 0.531 -0.8 1.008 7 5 
Fri 16 -0.207 0.265 -0.824 0.184 1 15 
Sat 3 -0.053 0.028 -0.08 -0.024 0 3 
Sun 0         0 0 
UnoX        
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Mon 14 0.02 0.434 -0.856 0.856 6 8 
Tue 11 0.075 0.385 -0.8 0.728 6 5 
Wed 4 -0.16 0.154 -0.344 0.032 1 3 
Thu 10 -0.047 0.534 -1.04 0.8 3 7 
Fri 13 0.009 0.495 -0.96 1.192 4 9 
Sat 5 -0.012 0.063 -0.056 0.08 2 3 
Sun 2 -0.084 0.006 -0.088 -0.08 0 2 
Smart        
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Mon 5 0.211 0.392 -0.264 0.768 3 2 
Tue 6 0.197 0.478 -0.32 0.856 3 3 
Wed 6 -0.369 0.3 -0.856 -0.12 0 6 
Thu 4 0.304 0.486 -0.344 0.832 3 1 
Fri 7 -0.062 0.117 -0.24 0.152 1 6 
Sat 1 -0.24  -0.24 -0.24 0 1 
Sun 2 -0.096 0.091 -0.16 -0.032 0 2 
 
 
Statoil Ask       
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Mon 3 0.555 0.263 0.368 0.856 3 0 
Tue 12 0.515 0.35 -0.144 0.968 11 1 
Wed 12 -0.439 0.343 -0.848 -0.024 0 12 
Thu 4 0.196 0.202 0.024 0.488 4 0 
Fri 9 0.03 0.591 -0.76 0.848 4 5 
Sat 4 -0.454 0.337 -0.848 -0.088 0 4 
Sun 0         0 0 
HydroTex       
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Mon 2 0.252 0.017 0.24 0.264 2 0 
Tue 11 0.516 0.385 -0.2 1.064 9 2 
Wed 8 -0.223 0.499 -0.744 0.744 2 6 
Thu 7 -0.187 0.561 -0.824 0.504 3 4 
Fri 10 -0.011 0.421 -0.504 0.744 3 7 
Sat 2 -0.856 0.294 -1.064 -0.648 0 2 
Sun 0         0 0 
        
 
Table 5.9. Distribution of adjustments in different days of the week. 
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5.4.1 NHH area 
As it can be seen from the table 5.9, a striking feature of distribution for StatoilNHH in 
comparison to other stations in the same area, is clear tendency of price increase on 
Mondays (16 increases in total 18 weeks in the period) and price decreases on Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays (14, 9 and 15 respectively). Similar patterns could be inferred from 
the day-of-the-week effect analysis, performed earlier. 
For UnoX and Smart no such clear tendencies can be seen. Only on Wednesdays and Fridays 
the amount of negative adjustments are clearly prevailing at Smart and in a smaller degree at 
UnoX. The striking feature for both automatic gas stations (Smart and UnoX) as well as for 
all full-service stations, is few (or none) price changes on Saturdays and Sundays. The 
simplest explanation can be that financial markets and the Rotterdam spot market are closed 
during weekend and thus no new information arrives on these days (Asplund et al., 2000).   
In NHH area lower prices on weekends can also be explained by different demand 
characteristics in comparison to Askøy area. Since the amount of adjustments on Saturdays 
and Sundays at all stations in the NHH area is very low or equals to zero, we can assume that 
the stations compete for low weekend prices (or presumably enter tacit collusion) on 
Fridays, which can be reflected in such a large number of one-way adjustments.       
Logically on Mondays firms can try to restore prices for the coming working week, which 
obviously has different demand characteristics. As it can be seen from the table, in NHH 
area only StatoilNHH has clear pattern of making positive and large price adjustments on 
Mondays. On Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Fridays, on the contrary, the station made mainly 
negative adjustments. 
 It can serve as a sign that Statoil leads price restorations in the area. According to M. Slade 
(1986), major players in the area often lead the price restorations, and these restorations are 
only sometimes successful, since others do not follow every time. In order to verify this 
statistically, we ran three regression equations for each station in the area using just seven 
dummy variables for each of different days of the week as predictors of price adjustments:  
∑
=
∗=Δ
7
1
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Results show that coefficient estimate for Monday dummy is higher for StatoilNHH (0.36) 
than for other two stations (0.09 for Smart and 0.001 for UnoX), which means that 
StatoilNHH increased prices mostly on Mondays and other stations did not always follow the 
increases and/or increases were not that large. The fact that other stations did not always 
follow or did not follow in the same degree, could be partly a reason of such profound 
weekly pattern for Statoil price adjustments, since the station needed to compete the price 
down during next days. Thursday was another day with positive adjustments prevailing over 
negative ones. Possible explanation could be that Statoil tried to signal price increase, 
hoping that other station will follow it just one day before the final reduction on Friday.  
5.4.2 Askøy area 
If we turn our attention to Askøy, it is evident that Statoil has pronounced pattern of price 
adjustments through the week in this area also, but rather different from the one in NHH 
area. Majority of price increases and decreases happens on Tuesdays and Wednesdays 
respectively. This pattern corresponds more to the behavior of HydroTexaco station situated 
in the same area, but the latter shows less clear cut character. There is also no such low price 
arrangement in weekends at Askøy as in NHH area. Such differences can be attributed to 
area characteristics, such as demographic and environmental variables, which according to 
Ingene and Brown (1987), influence the retail patterns in a great degree.  
In order to test if Statoil leads the price restorations in this area as well, we ran two similar 
regression equations for each station in the area using again seven dummy variables for each 
of different days of the week as predictors: 
∑
=
∗=Δ
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Results showed that coefficient estimates for Tuesday dummy (since Tuesday seems to be 
the day of main price increases on Askøy according to the results from the regression 
equation run reported in table 5.5 and from weekly adjustments distribution) were almost the 
same (around 0.38) for both stations. Therefore, we can’t say that Statoil displays signs of 
price restoration behavior in Askøy area.   
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Statoil NHH       
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Jan 5 0.136 0.478 -0.472 0.752 2 3 
Feb 17 0.000 0.666 -0.824 0.872 7 10 
Mar 19 0.008 0.460 -0.872 0.872 5 14 
Apr 16 0.016 0.354 -0.424 1.008 6 10 
May 17 -0.003 0.171 -0.272 0.352 7 10 
UnoX        
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Jan 2 0.020 0.107 -0.056 0.096 1 1 
Feb 11 0.054 0.467 -0.856 0.856 5 6 
Mar 16 0.014 0.376 -0.800 0.800 5 11 
Apr 17 -0.038 0.375 -0.960 0.744 6 11 
May 13 -0.028 0.488 -1.040 1.192 5 8 
Smart        
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Jan 0     0 0 
Feb 4 -0.042 0.701 -0.856 0.856 1 3 
Mar 13 0.078 0.431 -0.624 0.832 4 9 
Apr 10 -0.056 0.282 -0.344 0.392 3 7 
May 4 0.022 0.269 -0.240 0.336 2 2 
 
 
Statoil Ask       
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Jan 4 -0.002 0.609 -0.680 0.536 2 2 
Feb 14 0.029 0.726 -0.848 0.848 6 8 
Mar 11 0.058 0.585 -0.848 0.968 6 5 
Apr 14 0.013 0.358 -0.760 0.760 7 7 
May 1 0.584 . 0.584 0.584 1 0 
HydroTex        
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Jan 2 0.076 0.832 -0.512 0.664 1 1 
Feb 13 0.018 0.771 -1.064 1.064 6 7 
Mar 13 0.051 0.420 -0.504 0.744 6 7 
Apr 12 0.017 0.422 -0.800 0.696 6 6 
May 0     0 0 
 
Rotterdam+Tax       
  obs mean st.dev. min max obs>0 obs<0 
Jan 6 0.01 0.04 -0.025 0.085 3 3 
Feb 20 -0.002 0.056 -0.083 0.124 10 10 
Mar 23 0.016 0.048 -0.069 0.119 14 9 
Apr 19 0.014 0.062 -0.127 0.116 11 8 
May 19 -0.015 0.055 -0.102 0.072 8 11 
 
Table 5.10. Monthly distribution of adjustments. 
Analysis of a pattern of price adjustments in time on a monthly basis (table 5.10) does not 
show any clear trends. Though we should take into consideration that data was not 
continuous in several cases (some periods are missing for Smart (part of April), for Askøy 
area (part of May and the first two-thirds of January for all). It explains low quantity of 
adjustments for both StatoilAskøy and HydroTexaco stations in May. Another reason for small 
number of adjustments on Askøy in May can be a fact that Hydro Texaco closed for repairs 
in the second half of the month. Therefore, StatoilAskøy lost its only competitor and could 
maintain high prices without changing them at all. Prices were kept on the level, which 
exceeded even Statoil recommended price. 
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Another conclusion we can make from looking at the monthly data is that there were no 
severe price wars during the sampling period. Price adjustments were more or less evenly 
distributed in time given the restrictions, though in NHH area negative adjustments were 
more frequent in March for all stations. It can be partly explained by larger amount of 
adjustments for Rotterdam Spot price compared to other months, although the latter were 
mainly positive.  
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6. Discussion 
Five months of daily input and output prices for three major gasoline retail chains provide an 
opportunity to confront price-setting theories with data. The three main theories for how 
prices are set are tacit collusion model (the one we base our hypothesis on), imperfectly 
competitive non-collusive pricing model and competitive market model. Below we 
summarize the contribution of these theories to our understanding of the results obtained 
from the econometric analysis, which describes observed pricing pattern. If the tacit 
collusion model can be rejected, we can then determine whether the pricing pattern is more 
consistent with the type of pattern that could result from two alternative types of pricing 
behaviour.  
The main predictions of the tacit collusion model examined in this paper are that firms 
operating in tight oligopoly setting engage in price matching behaviour, and that retail 
gasoline prices in this case are above competitive level. The probability that a gas station 
engages in collusive pricing is affected by spatial differentiation, measures of local 
competition and the characteristics of the retailer. The way the firm’s retail prices respond to 
changes in input prices can also be used to substantiate the model.     
Our statistical analysis is based on a comparison of two relatively isolated geographical 
areas of Bergen. Previous empirical research (Pinkse et al., 2002) demonstrates that gasoline 
price competition is highly localized, and only measure of being nearest neighbors is a 
strong determinant of the strength of interterminal rivalry. Therefore, a decision to set a 
tacitly collusive price should be taken independently in every considered area.  
Our results show that the local variation for one retail chain across the areas (Statoil) refers 
to constant differences in the pattern of retail price adjustments and not to differences in 
prices levels. Paired t-tests showed that prices at two Statoil gas stations located in different 
areas are on average similar and higher than at all other gas stations belonging to different 
retail chains, but at the same time lower than the Statoil recommended price. Analysis of 
price adjustments exhibited different price setting patterns during the week in the areas; 
while regression equations run separately for both Statoil stations showed that retail prices at 
Statoil gas stations respond differently to changes in costs (Rotterdam input price) and 
Statoil recommended price.      
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Such different dynamic patterns can theoretically be produced by tacit collusion if we 
assume that stations are able to make sophisticated calculations to achieve the highest 
sustainable collusive price. On the other hand, both considered areas have very different 
characteristics, which most likely should result in different collusive prices. Moreover, in 
our theoretical part we allowed for constant differences between collusive prices for stations 
located in the same area.  
Majors (Statoil and HydroTexaco) on Askøy would have greater incentive to set tacitly 
collusive price than automatic stations UnoX and Smart, who can be more interested in 
undercutting. At the same time StatoilNHH faces fiercer competition since the amount of 
competitors is twice as high; therefore the collusion is again less likely in the NHH area. On 
the other hand, collusive pricing is more important for stations located along the major roads 
as in the NHH area, since their prices are easily observable.      
The results of the regression analysis in fact demonstrate that the three major factors, taken 
into consideration in the regression equations – competition (area specific factor), costs 
(common factor) and the company (common factor), explain retail price variation in the 
considered areas in different ways. We find that lagged input prices in a greater degree, and 
retail prices at the local competing gas stations UnoX and Smart in smaller degree, are 
significantly associated with trends in retail prices at StatoilNHH; whereas retail prices at the 
competing HydroTexaco station in greater degree, and retail prices at another Statoil station, 
located in different area (StatoilNHH), in smaller degree, are more important determinants of 
retail prices at StatoilAskøy. Therefore, competition is an important parameter for pricing at 
both stations in the sense that stations of the same area match their price adjustments, 
although for the Askøy area this parameter is more significant. These results are consistent 
with most predictions of tacit collusion model described above. They are consistent with 
predictions of imperfect competition model (INC) as well (more competitors – less 
matching), but inconsistent with the competitive model.  
If we look at the location for the stations, which according to INC should lead to more 
intensive competition along major roads and therefore higher variability and dispersion of 
retail prices, then results for the analysis of price adjustments can serve as a support to this 
model. 
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However, results show that high price volatility at StatoilNHH can be attributed mainly to two 
factors.  
First, the day-of-the-week effect is statistically significant in this area. Retail prices are 
generally lower in weekends and higher on Mondays, reflecting changing demand conditions 
during a week. These results are also consistent with both tacit collusion and INC, and 
inconsistent with the competitive model. Another factor, which could add to significance of 
the day-of-the-week effect, is price restoration efforts. Additional regression equations show 
that StatoilNHH acted like a price leader, performing price restoration efforts on Mondays by 
making large positive adjustments. This behavior is partly consistent with tacit collusion 
model, since according to our findings, other firms did not always follow the suit. In Askøy 
area no station acted like a price leader. 
Second, highly volatile lagged input prices are significantly associated with trends in retail 
prices at StatoilNHH, but are not significant determinants of prices at StatoilAskøy. Borenstein 
and Shepard (1996) describe the observed pattern of response to input prices by StatoilNHH as 
a sign of collusive behaviour. Although they state that other models (such as the inventory 
model or the consumer loyalty model) also can be possible explanations for this effect. 
A fluctuation in input prices is not a significant determinant of retail prices at StatoilAskøy. 
According to the tacit collusion model, this can be a sign of price rigidity, where the station 
is reluctant to change the prices as a response to cost changes, fearing to send the wrong 
message to competitors.  
We should also note that we did not find any significant correlation between retail prices at 
any of the Statoil stations and prices recommended by the supplier. Although according to 
tacit collusion model, recommended price can be used as a tool to facilitate coordination on 
a collusive price. In most periods retail prices were significantly lower than recommended 
price, with the exception of one period in Askøy, when HydroTexaco closed for repairs and 
the Statoil station became a monopolist. In this period the monopoly price was higher than 
the recommended price.  
*** 
We can conclude that in a short run stations of the same company located in different areas 
choose their pricing strategies based on the local competition conditions. For example, we 
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found signs of price restoration efforts in the NHH area and price rigidity on Askøy. 
Nevertheless, strong influence of the supplier (which is manifested in significant coefficient 
estimates of retail prices at Statoil gas station located in another area) leads to a situation 
where the competition climate in the areas is usually reflected not in different price level for 
gas stations of the same brand (price discrimination), but rather in different dynamics of 
price adjustments. The pattern of price adjustments reflects a particular strategical price-
setting behaviour chosen by the station as a result of conjectures about rival prices. 
However, data limitations (for example, lack of demand data or spatial assessment of the 
stations) make these conclusions more conjectural than affirmatory.  
Some findings are consistent with predictions from both the non-collusive imperfect 
competition model and the tacit collusion model. These include the effects of matching of 
price adjustments in the areas and day-of-the-week. Most of the results are inconsistent with 
the competitive model – prices vary inside and across geographical space, and the proximity 
to and the concentration of competitors influence the price adjustment pattern.  
However, some findings, such as gas stations response to costs, are consistent only with 
predictions of the tacit collusion model. Therefore, based on the evidence on retail price 
variation in the two Bergen areas, we are not able to reject the hypothesis that Norwegian 
retail gasoline chains enter into tacit collusive agreements in favour of either the imperfect 
competition model or the competitive model.                
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7. Conclusion 
It is a raising concern in many countries that limited competition between firms leads to 
higher retail gasoline prices, and yet little has so far been written on the effect of competition 
on the retail gasoline prices in Norway. This study contains empirical estimates of the 
impact of local market competition, input prices and common strategies of Norwegian oil 
companies on trends in daily retail gasoline prices. We found that the way prices respond to 
mentioned factors conforms more to the tacit collusion model than to the more widely used 
competition model. This result is not very surprising because the structure of the Norwegian 
retail gasoline industry is a tight oligopoly setting, which is the main prerequisite for the 
formal models of collusion. The results show that evidence supporting tacitly collusive 
pricing is reflected in the dynamic pattern observed in retail pricing by the firms, rather than 
in the situation where prices are close to or equal to a monopoly level or to prices of other 
firms.  
The results of this paper should be of interest to Norwegian policymakers. They suggest that 
when taking decisions and initiating projects under wrong assumptions about competition 
climate in the region, authorities should expect that these decisions can have limited or 
reverse impact on local retail or wholesale competition and lead to undesired price 
movements. On the other hand, authorities initiatives aimed at enhancing retail and 
wholesale competition could have some positive effects on retail prices.   
The main limitation of this study has been the failure to incorporate the influence of a local 
demand parameter into the model. We also think that a more rich data set, covering bigger 
amounts of gas stations and geographical areas, would have contributed to more precision in 
our conclusions. Therefore, we would recommend further extended research in this area. The 
results have, however, provided certain indication of the way competition climate in the 
country influences daily retail gasoline prices.  
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